Abstract-The last few years have seen the use of photo response non-uniformity noise (PRNU), a unique fingerprint of imaging sensors, in various digital forensic applications such as source device identification, content integrity verification, and authentication. However, the use of a color filter array for capturing only one of the three color components per pixel introduces color interpolation noise, while the existing methods for extracting PRNU provide no effective means for addressing this issue. Because the artificial colors obtained through the color interpolation process are not directly acquired from the scene by physical hardware, we expect that the PRNU extracted from the physical components, which are free from interpolation noise, should be more reliable than that from the artificial channels, which carry interpolation noise. Based on this assumption we propose a couple-decoupled PRNU (CD-PRNU) extraction method, which first decomposes each color channel into four sub-images and then extracts the PRNU noise from each sub-image. The PRNU noise patterns of the sub-images are then assembled to get the CD-PRNU. This new method can prevent the interpolation noise from propagating into the physical components, thus improving the accuracy of device identification and image content integrity verification.
I. Introduction
A S DIGITAL multimedia processing hardware and software become more affordable and their functionalities become more versatile, their use in our everyday life becomes ubiquitous. However, while most of us enjoy the benefits these technologies have to offer, the very same set of technologies can also be exploited to manipulate contents for malicious purposes. Consequently, the credibility of digital multimedia when used as evidence in legal and security domains will be constantly challenged and has to be scientifically proved. After over 15 years of intensive research, digital watermarking [1] - [7] has been accepted as an effective way of verifying content integrity in a wide variety of applications and will continue to Y. Li is with the College of Software, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China (e-mail: liyue80@nankai.edu.cn).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ TCSVT.2011.2160750 play an important role in multimedia protection and security. However, because of the need of proactive embedding of extra information in the host media, digital watermarking is only applicable when such a data embedding mechanism is available and the application standards/protocols are followed. Given this limitation it is of no doubt that unwatermarked multimedia will keep on being produced. Moreover, there has been an enormous number of existing unwatermarked media in circulation and it is in no way that digital watermarking can be of help in carrying out digital investigation when these pieces of unwatermarked multimedia are the objects in question. In the light of these issues, the recent years have seen an increasing number of publications on digital forensics [8] - [13] , which rely on extracting device signature left in the images/videos by acquisition devices [14] - [17] to verify the credibility and identify the source of digital images/videos. A device signature may take the form of sensor pattern noise [11] , [14] , [18] - [20] , camera response function [21] , re-sampling artifacts [22] , color filter array (CFA) interpolation artifacts [12] , [16] , JPEG compression [13] , [23] , lens aberration [24] , [25] , sensor dust [8] , and so on. Other device and image attributes such as binary similarity measures, image quality measures, and higher order wavelet statistics have also been exploited to identify and classify source devices [17] , [26] , [27] .
A. Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)
Among so many types of intrinsic device signatures, sensor pattern noise [11] , [14] , [19] , [20] , [28] has drawn much attention due to its feasibility in identifying not only device models of the same make, but also individual devices of the same model [9] , [11] , [14] . Sensor pattern noise is mainly caused by imperfections during the manufacturing process of semiconductor wafers and slight variations in which individual sensor pixels convert light to electrical signal [29] . It is this uniqueness of manufacturing imperfections and nonuniformity of photo-electronic conversion that makes sensor pattern noise capable of identifying imaging sources to the accuracy of individual devices. The reader is referred to [29] for more details in relation to sensor pattern noise.
The dominating component of sensor pattern noise is PRNU [14] , [29] . However, the PRNU can be contaminated by various types of noise introduced at different stages of the image acquisition process. Fig. 1 demonstrates the image acquisition process [30] . A color photo is represented in three color components (i.e., R, G, and B). For most digital cameras, during the image acquisition process, the lenses let through the rays of the three color components of the scene, but for every pixel only the rays of one color component are passed through the CFA and subsequently converted into electronic signals by the sensor. This color filtering is determined by the CFA. After the conversion, a color interpolation function generates the electronic signals of the other two color components for every pixel according to the color intensities of the neighboring pixels. This color interpolation process is commonly known as demosaicking [31] - [33] . The signals then undergo additional signal processing such as white balance, gamma correction, and image enhancement. Finally, these signals are stored in the camera's memory in a customized format, primarily the JPEG format.
In acquiring an image, the signal will inevitably be distorted when passing through each process and these distortions result in slight differences between the scene and the cameracaptured image [14] . As formulated in [11] , a camera output model can be expressed as follows:
where I is the output image, is the input signal of the scene, g is the color channel gain, γ(= 0.455) is the gamma correction factor, K is the zero-mean multiplicative factor responsible for the PRNU, and , s , r , q stand for dark current, shot noise, read-out noise, and quantization (lossy compression) noise, respectively. In (1), s and r are random noise and is the fixed pattern noise that is associated with every camera and can be removed by subtracting a dark frame from the image taken by the same camera [34] . Since is the dominating term in (1), after applying Taylor expansion to (1) and keeping the first two terms of the expansion
where I (0) is the denoised image and is the ensemble of the noises, including, , s , r , and q . The PRNU pattern noise K can then be formulated as
where
is the noise residual obtained by applying a denoising filter on Image I. Although various denoising filters can be used, the wavelet-based denoising process (i.e., the discrete wavelet transform followed by a Wiener filtering operation), as described in [14, Appendix A], has been reported as effective in producing good results.
B. Use of PRNU in Device Identification
The basic idea of using the PRNU noise pattern in device identification can be described as follows.
1) First, for each imaging device d, the noise residual patterns are extracted using (5) from a number of lowcontrast images taken by device d and then the PRNU is estimated using the ML estimation procedure adopted by Chen et al. [11] , that is
where S is the number of images involved in the calculation, γ is the gamma correction factor (γ ≈ 0. 
is used to compare the noise W I against the reference fingerprint K d , where • is the mean function. Note in (6), instead of using K d , we used I ·K d as suggested in [11] . Again the multiplication operation in (6) is elementwise. Given the PRNU-based approaches' potential in resolving device identification problem to the accuracy at individual device level, it is important that the PRNU extracted is as close to the genuine pattern noise due to the sensor as possible. Since for most cameras, only one of the three colors of each pixel is physically captured by the sensor while the other two are artificially interpolated by the demosaicking process, this inevitably introduces noise with power stronger than that of the genuine PRNU. We can see from (2), (3), and (4) that the accuracy of both PRNU K and noise residual W depends on the denoising operation applied to I in obtaining I (0) . However, as mentioned earlier that the most common method [11] , [14] , [15] , [18] of obtaining I (0) is to apply the discrete wavelet transform followed by a Wiener filtering operation directly to the entire Image I without differentiating physical components from artificial components and, as a result, allowing the interpolation noise in the artificial components to contaminate the real PRNU in the physical components. Addressing this shortcoming is the motivation of this paper. In this paper, we will look at the impact of demosaicking on PRNU fidelity in Section II and propose an improved formula for extracting PRNU in Section III. In Section IV, we present some experiments on device identification and image content integrity verification to validate the proposed PRNU extraction formula. Section V concludes this paper. Because the PRNU is formulated in (3) and (5) as a function of the noise residual W [i.e., (4)], in the rest of the work we will use the two terms, PRNU and noise residual, interchangeably whenever there is no need to differentiate them.
II. Demosaicking Impact on PRNU Fidelity
In this paper, we call the color components physically captured by the sensor as physical colors and the ones artificially interpolated by the demosaicking function as artificial colors. Due to the fact that demosaicking is a key deterministic process that affects the quality of color images taken by many digital devices, demosaicking has been rigorously investigated [31] - [33] , [35] , [36] . Most demosaicking approaches group the missing colors before applying an interpolation function. The grouping process is usually content-dependent, e.g., edgeadaptive or non-adaptive, hence the accuracy of color interpolation result is also content-dependent [37] . For example, in a homogeneous area, because of the low variation of the color intensities of neighboring pixels, the interpolation function can more accurately generate artificial components [30] . Conversely, in inhomogeneous areas, the color variation between neighboring pixels is greater, thus the interpolation noise is also more significant.
This indicates that the PRNU in physical color components is more reliable than that in the artificial components. However, the existing method for extracting PRNU as formulated in (4) and (5) based on the definition of the output image model in (1) does not take this into account [11] . To extract the PRNU using (4) and (5), the discrete wavelet transform followed by a Wiener filtering operation is applied. The main problem inherent to (4) is that it involves the whole image plane, which contains both artificial and physical components, in one noise residual extraction process. However, each coefficient of the wavelet transform used in the noise residual extraction process involves multiple pixels and thus both artificial and physical components. As a result, the interpolation noise gets diffused from the artificial components into the physical ones. For example, in the red color component/plane of an image taken by a camera with a Bayer CFA, only one fourth of the pixels' red color are physical and for each pixel with physical red color all its 8-neighbors' red colors are artificial. When wavelet transform is applied during the noise residual extraction process the interpolation noise residing in the artificial components propagates into the physical components. Therefore, it is desirable to devise a noise residual extraction method that can prevent the artificial components from contaminating the reliable PRNU residing in the physical components with the interpolation noise.
III. Formulation of Color Decoupled
PRNU (CD-PRNU) In this section, we will discuss the formulation and extraction of CD-PRNU. First, a mathematical model for the CD-PRNU is derived and then an extraction algorithm is proposed to extract the noise residual that is to be used for estimating the final CD-PRNU, without prior knowledge about the CFA.
A. Mathematical Model of CD-PRNU
A generic demosaicking process is to convolve an interpolation matrix with an image block of the same size centered at the pixel where the artificial color is to be calculated [10] , [16] , [31] . Although the 2×2 Bayer CFA is the most common CFA pattern, to make the proposed CD-PRNU versatile and applicable to cameras adopting different CFA patterns, we make no assumption about the CFA pattern, F, except that it is a 2 × 2 square array. Let be an interpolation matrix with 2N + 1 × 2N + 1 coefficients and = { c |c ∈ {R, G, B}} be a X×Y -pixel input signal from the scene consisting of three color components, R (red), G (green), and B (blue) before color interpolation. That is to say that for each pixel (x, y), only one of the three color components takes a value physically captured by the sensor and this color is determined by the color configuration of the CFA pattern F. The other two color components are to be determined by the demosaicking process. For each color component of a pixel, c (x, y), c ∈ {R, G, B}, can be determined according to
(7) The first part of (7) means that if the color component c is the same as the color that the CFA pattern F allows to pass, i.e., F (x mod 2, y mod 2) = c, then no demosaicking is needed because c has been physically captured by the sensor. Otherwise, the second part of (7) is artificially applied to calculate the color. According to (7) , the image output model of (1) proposed in [11] can be re-formulated as
(8) According to (3), we know that K << 1 because W << I (0) . Therefore (1 + K) ≈ 1 and if we define the interpolation noise P as = 1 + P, the second part of (8) 
This is because, for the artificial components, the interpolation noise P is many orders greater than the PRNU K and K << 1, therefore (1 + P)(1 + K) is virtually equal to (1 + P). As a result, (8) can be reformulated as
Equation (9) suggests that in the artificial components, the PRNU is actually the interpolation noise P while, in the physical components, the PRNU remains unaffected by the interpolation noise.
It can also be seen from (9) that the physical components and artificial components have similar mathematical expression. Hence, if the physical and artificial color components can be separated/decoupled, P can be extracted in the same way as the sensor pattern noise K is extracted [i.e., (3)]. That is
where I (0),a is a low-passed filtered version of the artificial components I a and W a is the corresponding "sensor pattern noise," which is actually the interpolation noise. We can also use the same ML estimate as in (5) 
where 
B. CD-PRNU Extraction Algorithm
According to (10) and (11), we can extract the sensor pattern noise and interpolation noise, respectively, from the physical and artificial components if the CFA is known. However, manufacturers usually do not provide information about the CFA used by their cameras [30] . Therefore, several methods have been proposed to estimate the CFA [10] , [12] , [16] , [38] . Unfortunately, these methods have to exhaust all of the possible CFA patterns in order to infer/estimate the "real"/optimal CFA. However, exhaustive search is by no means acceptable. In this paper, to extract the CD-PRNU, we first separate the three color channels I c , c ∈ {R, G, B} of a color Image I of X × Y pixels. Most CFA patterns are of 2 × 2 elements and are periodically mapped to the sensors. We know that, for each pixel of I, only one of the three color components is physical and the other two are artificial, so the second step is, for each channel I c , we perform a 2:1 downsampling across both horizontal and vertical dimensions to get four sub-images, I c,i,j , i, j ∈ {0, 1}, such that
where x ∈ 0, X/2 − 1 and y ∈ 0, Y/2 − 1 . For each color channel, I c , without knowing the CFA pattern used by the manufacturer, we do not know (actually we do not have to know) which pixels carry the color captured physically by the hardware and which are not. But by decomposing I c into four sub-images, I c,IJ , we know that each of the four sub-images either contains only the physical color or only the artificial colors. By de-coupling the physical and artificial color components in this fashion before extracting the noise residual, we can prevent the artificial components from contaminating the physical components during the DWT process. Equation (4) is then used to obtain noise residual W c,i,j from each sub-images, ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, the CD-PRNU W c of each color channel c is formed by combining the four sub-noise residuals W c,i,j , ∀i, JE{0, 1} such that
and mod is the modulo operation. The framework of the color decoupled noise residual extraction process is shown in Fig. 2 and the procedures are listed in Algorithm 1. Note that Algorithm 1 is for extracting the noise residual pattern W from an Image I. To estimate the CD-PRNU P d of a particular device d and use it as the reference signature of d, (11) is applied.
IV. Experimental Results
In this section, we carry out experiments on source camera identification and image content integrity verification to validate the feasibility of the proposed CD-PRNU in a comparative manner.
A. Source Camera Identification
We have carried out source camera identification tests on 300 2048 × 1536-pixel photos of natural scenes taken by six cameras (C 1 to C 6 ), each responsible for 50. The six cameras are listed in Table I . The reference PRNU (i.e., P C i , i ∈ [1, 6]) of each camera C i is generated by taking the weighted average of the PRNUs extracted from 30 photos of blue sky according to (11) . For device identification purposes, we need clean PRNUs (which appear as high frequency bands of images) as device fingerprints for comparison against the PRNU extracted from individual images under investigation. The reason blue-sky images are chosen in this paper is because blue sky contains less scene details (high frequency signal), thus giving better chance of extracting clean PRNU. Actually, other images with low-variation scenes (i.e., scenes without significant details) can be used instead. Taking the average 
TABLE I

Cameras Used in the Experiments
Symbol Camera C 1 Canon IXUS 850IS C 2 Canon PowerShot A400 C 3 Canon IXY Digital 500 C 4 FujiFilm A602 C 5 Olympus FE210 C 6 Olympus C730
of the PRNUs from 30 blue sky images is to further reduce variation. Our empirical experience suggests that an average of 20 blue sky images is accurate enough. Source camera identification requires similarity comparisons among PRNUs (CD-PRNUs) and therefore the feasibility of the chosen similarity metrics is important. Fridrich suggested the use of the peak-to-correlation energy (PCE) measure in [15] , which has been proved to be a more stable detection statistics than normalized cross-correlation when applied to the scenarios in which the images of interest may have undergone geometrical manipulations, such as rotation or scaling. The purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate the capability of the proposed CD-PRNU in dealing with the color interpolation noise, so geometrical transformations will not be applied in order to prevent biased evaluation from happening. Therefore, in the following experiments, normalized crosscorrelation formulated as in (6) will be used to measure the similarity between PRNUs (CD-PRNUs).
In practice, the normalized cross-correlation has to be greater than a specified threshold for a camera to be identified as the source camera. However, in this experiment, the key point is about demonstrating the different performance of the traditional PRNU and the proposed CD-PRNU. Therefore, a camera is identified as the source camera, if out of the six reference PRNUs (or CD-PRNUs), its reference PRNU (or CD-PRNU) is most similar to the PRNU (or CD-PRNU), W I , of the Image I under investigation. Because PRNU is often used in content integrity verification, where smaller image blocks have to be analyzed, we also compare the performance of the proposed CD-PRNU against that of the traditional PRNU [11] when they are applied to blocks of five different sizes cropped from the center of the full-sized PRNU (CD-PRNU). Table II lists the identification rates. Individually speaking, C 1 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 and C 6 perform significantly better when CD-PRNU is used in all cases, except for a few cases when images are of full size (1536 × 2048 pixels) and the identification rates are close or equal to 100% (1.0000). For C 2 , PRNU performs equally well as CD-PRNU when the image size is 192 × 256 pixels and slightly outperforms CD-PRNU when the block size is 48×64 pixels. We suspect that the reason C 2 does not perform as expected is because the CFA pattern is not a 2 × 2 square array as we have assumed. Another reason is that, because the smaller the images, the less data is available, therefore identification results become less reliable. Generally speaking, when the statistics of the six cameras are pooled together, as listed in the Total column of Table II, we can see that CD-PRNU still outperforms PRNU significantly. This has been graphically presented in Fig. 3(a) . In Fig. 3(b) , a ROC curve of the performance of PRNU and CD-PRNU is demonstrated.
We can see that the CD-PRNU outperforms the PRNU because at all fixed false positive rates the CD-PRNU's true positive rates are always higher than that of the PRNU.
For a system with a Pentium Core II 1.3G CPU and 3 GB RAM, it takes 0.526 s to compute the similarity between the PRNUs of two images of 2048 × 1536 pixels and 0.567 s to calculate the similarity between a pair of CD-PRNUs of the same size. The amount of data processed during the extraction of PRNU and CD-PRNU is the same. Although extracting CD-PRNU requires down-sampling and up-sampling, these two operations are trivial and only incur negligible increase of time complexity.
B. Content Integrity Verification
We also carried out the following three content integrity verification experiments on 640 × 480-pixel images.
1) In the first experiment, we copied a 160 × 390-pixel area from Image I.1 in Fig. 4(a) , and pasted it at approximately the same location in Image I.2 in Fig. 4(b) to create the forged Image I.3 as shown in Fig. 4(c) . The images in Fig. 4 (a) and (b) are taken by Olympus C730. 2) In the second experiment, we cropped an 80 × 100-pixel area from Image II.1 in Fig. 5(a) , which covers the face of the person, pasted it at the area where the face of another person is in Image II.2 in Fig. 5(b) to create the forged Image II.3 in Fig. 5(c) . The images in Fig. 5(a) and (b) are also taken by the same camera. 3) In the third experiment, we cropped a 60 × 80-pixel area from Image III.1 in Fig. 6(a) taken by Canon PowerShot A400, which covers the face of the person, pasted it at the area where the face of another person is in Image III.2 in Fig. 6(b) , which is taken by Olympus C730, to create the forged Image III.3 in Fig. 6(c) . To detect the manipulated areas, we slid a 128 × 128-pixel window across the PRNU extracted from the image under investigation and another window of the same size across the reference PRNU of the cameras that have taken images I.2, II.2, and III.2. In Chen's method [11] , the windows are moved a pixel at a time, which incurs a high computational load. Moreover, this method is not accurate at the pixel level [11] . Therefore, in our experiment, the sliding step/displacement is set to 5 pixels in order to reduce the computational load without sacrificing the accuracy of the integrity verification. Table III lists the number of manipulated and non-manipulated blocks of 5 × 5 pixels in the forged images.
To decide whether a block centered at the window superposed on the image has been manipulated or not, the crosscorrelation of the PRNU patterns inside the two windows at the same location was calculated according to (6) . If the cross-correlation is lower than a predetermined threshold t, the block in the center of the window is deemed as manipulated. As discussed in [11] , the cross-correlation follows the generalized Gaussian (GG) distribution, therefore, we use various thresholds defined as T (t) = μ − t · σ to analyze the performance of PRNU and CD-PRNU, where μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the correlations distribution, respectively, and T (t) is the threshold. By varying the value of t, we can evaluate the integrity verification performance across a wide range of correlation thresholds T (t). In the following experiments, we will allow t to vary independently in the range from 0.0 to 3.0 and use the four metrics, true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN) and false negative (FN) to measure the performance of integrity verifications based on According to Chen's predication [11] , "the block dimensions impose a lower bound on the size of tampered regions that our algorithm can identify. Thus, we remove all simply connected tampered regions from Z that contain less than 64 × 64 pixels (one quarter of the number of pixels in the block)." Chen applies erosion and dilation operations with a square 20×20 kernel in order to filter small areas identified as tampered with. The final authentication result is a image with the dilated areas highlighted as the tampered areas. However, the performance of the filtering/dilation operation strongly depends on parameter setting and hence many experiments must be run to obtain the best parameters for filtering. In order to simplify the comparison and to obtain a fair result, we use the raw data without any filtering to calculate the TP, TN, FP, and FN. As a result, the experiments on III.3 demonstrate that CD-PRNU-based method significantly outperforms the PRNU-based method when the tampered area is about one quarter of the sliding window.
C. Experiment on Image I.3
Fig . 7 shows the performance of the PRNU and CD-PRNU in terms of TP, TN, FP, and FN when authentication is carried out on Image I.3 across a range of correlation threshold T (t). We can see from Fig. 7(a) and (b) that CD-PRNU generally achieves higher TP and TN while maintaining lower FP and FN. A lower correlation (similarity) allows the algorithm to detect more manipulated blocks, leading to higher TP. However, a low threshold also results in the situation where more authentic blocks are mistakenly detected as manipulated, giving rise to a higher FP. Therefore, a ROC curve of TP rate with respect to FP rate can be used to evaluate the overall performance of the PRNU and CD-PRNU. Let α be the number of manipulated blocks and β be the number of authentic blocks, the ROC is formulated as At the same false positive rate (FP/β), which is marked along the horizontal axis of the ROC curve, an algorithm with better performance will have a higher true positive rate (TP/α), which is marked vertically. The ROC curves for the integrity verification experiments on Image I.3 are illustrated as Fig. 8 . It is clear that the ROC curve of the PRNU-based scheme mostly overlaps with that of Random Guess, which means the authentication result is generally as unreliable as that of a random guess. This is because the area we copied from the source Image I.1 is at approximately the same location as the original area in Image I.2; therefore the PRNU pattern noises in the two areas are almost the same. As a result, the scheme cannot detect the manipulated area based on PRNU. By contrast, the CD-PRNU-based scheme results in a curve much higher than the PRNU-based method, which means that by using CD-PRNU manipulated blocks can be detected more reliably.
D. Experiment on Image II.3
When verifying the integrity of Image II.3, CD-PRNU's consistently higher TP and lower FN, as shown in Fig. 9(a) , (d), again indicate its superiority to PRNU. However, mixed performance in terms of TN and FP can be seen in Fig. 9(b), (c) . Albeit their mixed performance in terms of TN and FP, both PRNU and CD-PRNU can effectively detect the manipulated blocks as their ROC curves have suggested in Fig. 10 . Fig. 10 also shows that the ROC curve of CD-PRNU is still slightly higher than that of PRNU, indicating a slightly better performance of CD-PRNU.
E. Experiment on Image III.3
When authenticating III.3, although the performance of PRNU and CD-PRNU in terms of TN and FP are mixed, as can be seen in Fig. 11(b) , (c), CD-PRNU's significantly better performance in terms of TP and lower FN can still be seen again in Fig. 11(a), (d) , respectively. When the threshold t is higher than 1.1, the PRNU cannot correctly detect any manipulated blocks [i.e., TP = 0 as demonstrated in Fig. 11(a) ]. This poor performance is also reflected in the PRNU's ROC curve in Fig. 12 and is due to the fact that he manipulated area is too small (60 × 80 pixels), which is only about one quarter of the sliding window (128 × 128 pixels). Chen predicated in [11] that one quarter of the sliding window is the lower bound on the size of tampered regions that our algorithm can identify, and therefore areas smaller than this should be filtered in order to remove the falsely identified noise. The experiment result on III.3 conforms to Chen's observation. Since the tampered area is 60 × 80 pixels, approximately one quarter of the window, the method based on PRNU can perform no better than a random guess. By contrast, the manipulated blocks can be effectively detected by the CD-PRNU-based scheme because the areas in question are from two images taken by different cameras and thus contain different interpolation noise. As a result, the CD-PRNU-based method can identify smaller areas.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we pointed out that the use of a CFA in the image acquisition process can lead to inaccurate extraction of the PRNU, a commonly used fingerprint for identifying source imaging devices and image authentication. We also proposed a simple, yet effective, CD-PRNU extraction method, which can prevent the CFA interpolation error from diffusing from the artificial color channels into the physical channels, thus improving the accuracy of the fingerprint. Moreover, the proposed method requires no a priori knowledge about the CFA color configuration. Experiments on source camera identification and content integrity verification have been carried out to test our proposed CD-PRNU extraction method and significant improvement has been confirmed.
